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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000665

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STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [BM](#) [ASSK](#)

SUBJECT: RAZALI: NO ACCESS TO ASSK AS YET, MEETING WITH
MAUNG AYE ON JUNE 9

REF: RANGOON 664

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D).

11. (C) Summary: Late on June 7, Special Envoy Razali briefed COM Martinez on his meeting earlier in the day with SPDC Secretary One Khin Nyunt. Khin Nyunt told Razali that the crackdown on the NLD was in response to actions by ASSK that constituted an unacceptable threat to the SPDC. He assured Razali that ASSK was in good health and provided two photos dated May 31 to prove it. Razali said he did not contest Khin Nyunt's justification for the crackdown, choosing instead to make the case that it was absolutely essential that he gain access to her on this visit. Khin Nyunt said this was not his decision to make and asked for Razali to make the case for access to ASSK directly to Vice Senior General Maung Aye in a meeting early Monday. The SE is well aware that this may just be a ploy to wear out his patience so he will leave and the SPDC can claim that he "quit." Razali is determined to go the last mile and see Maung Aye, although he did not seem hopeful of the outcome. End Summary.

12. (C) Special Envoy Razali and his team (Hitoki Den, Damon Bristow, and Leon DeReidmatten) met with COM Martinez on June 7 to provide a read-out of his meeting earlier in the day with SPDC Secretary One General Khin Nyunt. In what he termed "a long session" with Khin Nyunt, Razali said he made a strong case for access to Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), saying, among other things, that it would be an embarrassment to ASEAN to not allow the Special Envoy access. Razali said Khin Nyunt responded with a long explanation of the SPDC's perception that ASSK posed an unacceptable threat to the state based on her recent actions. Khin Nyunt provided photos of crowds that have gathered to hear ASSK at various stops and said she had begun to deviate from the agreement she had with the SPDC on the parameters of her travel. Khin Nyunt said that in addition to the agreed to visits to NLD offices, ASSK had begun impromptu visits to monasteries and delivering roadside talks, often taking the opportunity to criticize the government and the performance of civil servants. Khin Nyunt stated that the regime had evidence that ASSK had also been meeting with other political parties, some of whom had ties to groups responsible for recent bombings in Burma.

13. (C) In a strange twist, Razali said Khin Nyunt posited that ASSK's more threatening stance began after a January 2003 meeting she had with ex-Charge d'Affaires to Rangoon Priscilla Clapp (Note: Clapp made a personal visit to Rangoon in January. If she met with ASSK, it was with no Embassy involvement. End Note.) COM asked Razali to clarify if Khin Nyunt indicated that the regime believed that Clapp was in Rangoon on instructions from Washington or if they understood that she was on a personal visit. Razali said this was not clear from what Khin Nyunt said but the regime clearly linked the change in ASSK's strategy to the Clapp visit. (Comment: This is in all likelihood a red herring thrown out by Khin Nyunt in order to build on the theme that ASSK is a pawn of foreign governments. We do not know, however, how much the regime may believe its own propaganda. End Comment.) Khin Nyunt said that the regime had evidence that the NLD had recently been working with other political parties to "bring things to a boil" before Razali's visit and that there was a plan to proclaim democracy on June 17, ASSK's birthday and to demand a transfer of power by September.

14. (C) Razali said he was dumbfounded by the logic behind Khin Nyunt's presentation. "What do they expect, the people love her, of course they are going to turn out." And he was very concerned with the regime's response to this perceived threat; "If they think the crowds that came out to see her were bad, wait until they see what will happen if they continue to hold her." He deemed it totally illogical to respond to this perceived threat with a harsh crackdown. Razali said he did not want to take on the substance of Khin Nyunt's presentation at that point and, instead, he told Khin Nyunt there would be time to hash through all of these issues later but the immediate priority was to get access to ASSK. Khin Nyunt responded by showing Razali two photographs dated May 31 showing ASSK sitting on a four-poster bed in nice surroundings with a few females, possibly her assistants.

Razali said ASSK looked fine, "not a scratch," in the photos, but he told Khin Nyunt that this was no substitute for meeting with her. At this point, Khin Nyunt told Razali, "I can't do it, it's not my decision, it is a group decision." Razali implored Khin Nyunt to take the issue to the others necessary to make the decision and make the case, reiterating that it was of utmost importance.

15. (C) Khin Nyunt finally responded by asking if Razali would meet with Vice Senior General Maung Aye on Monday, June 9 in the morning to make the case for access to ASSK directly to him. Razali told COM that this would be the first substantive meeting he would have ever had with Maung Aye. Razali speculated whether Khin Nyunt needed Maung Aye's support in order to take the issue to Senior General Than Shwe or if perhaps Maung Aye is behind the recent hard-liner retrenchment and crackdown. Razali said Maung Aye has gone to lengths to avoid any substantive discussion with him, so Razali looks forward to hopefully gaining an insight into the decision making process of the junta's top three, in addition to obtaining access to ASSK. He said he was not very confident that they would allow him access to her but there was at least a small chance. At any rate, he felt that he would probably know after the Maung Aye meeting whether or not he would gain access to ASSK. If not, he said he would probably leave on the noon flight to Kuala Lumpur.

16. (C) Discussing the intense press interest in his visit, Razali said he would just say at this point "he continues to work hard to obtain access to ASSK." After discussing various scenarios for a departure statement with the COM, he felt it probably best to provide a short statement in Rangoon before departing for KL where he will provide a full briefing to the international press.

17. (C) Comment: The SE is well aware that the SPDC is probably trying to wear out his patience hoping he will leave so they can claim that the SE "gave up." Razali is determined, however, to go the last mile and see Maung Aye on June 9. At this point though the SE did not seem hopeful of getting access to ASSK. This is particularly worrisome as we and others in the diplomatic community are receiving more frequent reports that ASSK may have received serious injuries in the May 30 attack. End Comment.
Martinez